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n “Minds, Brains and Science,” John Searle attempts to 
show that the mind is necessarily more than simply an in-
stantiation of a computer program.  Parts of Searle‟s argu-
ment are quite persuasive; indeed some of his conclusions 
are both valid and, I believe, sound.  However, his overall con-
clusion is somewhat misleading.  The thesis that Searle refutes 
(strong artificial intelligence, or AI, as he terms it) is essentially 
the view that the brain is a sort of hardware and mind is a sort of 
software.  Thus, according to this thesis, if we could program the 
correct software, we could program a mind.  By refuting this the-
sis, Searle seems to have refuted all claims to the possibility of 
artificial intelligence.  However, I will attempt to show that 
Searle‟s argument misses the mark and that, while the mind is 
not like a program running on certain hardware, the brain is.  In 
so doing, I will also address the adequacy of the Turing test as a 
test of AI, as Searle‟s argument does show the worth of this test 
to be suspect. 
 
The Turing Test and Artificial Intelligence 
 
The Turing test is the first scientific attempt to test the 
abilities of AI; that is, to determine whether not a machine dem-
onstrates intelligence.  The test essentially works as follows:  the 
test administrator asks a series of questions to two different in-
terlocutors, A and B.  However, A is a human being, while B is a 
machine.  Their responses to the questions are returned as text to 
the test administrator.  According to Turing, if a skilled adminis-
trator cannot determine which interlocutor is a human and 
which is a machine (based on the appropriateness of their re-
sponses), then the machine is exhibiting artificial intelligence.  
Now, given that the test administrator can ask anything of the 
machine (she could, in theory, just type gibberish), it seems that 
the standards for passing this test are sufficiently high.  After all, 
it is unlikely that even a modern computer, which can execute 
billions of instructions per second, would be able to consistently 
come up with appropriate responses to the queries in a timely 
fashion.  Additionally, the program required to handle all of this 
language processing would have to be incredibly complex.  All 
things considered, the Turing test sets a high standard for artifi-
cial intelligence. 
However, the Turing test is inherently flawed in such a 
way that it cannot truly measure the intelligence of a machine.  
The Turing test is essentially a behavioral test; that is, it measures 
the degree to which a machine succeeds in behaving like a hu-
man being.  As such, it sets itself up for relatively straightfor-
ward counterexamples.  One such counterexample, borrowed 
from Ned Block1, runs as follows:  suppose that we build a ma-
chine that is essentially an incredibly complex jukebox.  For any 
given input, the program on this machine searches its database 
for the appropriate output.  Now, if we could build a database of 
billions of input statements, each with their appropriate outputs, 
it is likely that this machine would pass the Turing test.  How-
ever, this machine operates on the same principle as a jukebox, a 
machine to which we would be loath to ascribe intelligence.  
Thus, the Turing test, stringent as it is, it not a sufficient test by 
which to judge whether machine is exhibiting intelligence.  The 
simple fact that a machine can behave like a human in certain, 
limited circumstances, is not sufficient to show that it is actually 
intelligent. 
 A more sweeping criticism of AI in general comes from 
John Searle, in the form of his famous „Chinese Room‟ argument.  
The essential idea is this:  imagine yourself (assuming that you 
do not understand any Chinese) in a room that has only the nec-
essary items to create a rule-based input/output system.  These 
items are:  several baskets of funny shaped symbols (Chinese 
characters, unbeknownst to you), a very complex rulebook, and 
input and output slots.  The rulebook contains rules for govern-
ing which symbols to put in the output slot, given the appear-
ance of certain symbols in the input slot, and your internal state 
(e.g. whether or not you are in a state of having already received 
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a certain input).  Now, imagine that the rulebook is thorough 
enough so that you always can pass out an appropriate Chinese 
answer to an input question.  This machine (you) would clearly 
pass the Turing test but it would not understand Chinese.  The 
notion of understanding is critical here because Searle wants to 
ultimately claim that the Chinese room program cannot exhibit 
intelligence because it has only syntax (e.g. formal rules), and it 
cannot ascribe any meaning to the symbols that it confronts.  
Like Block, Searle creates an example in which there is a machine 
that can pass the Turing test, but it clearly does not exhibit intel-
ligence.  However, Searle‟s argument cuts deeper because it 
seems to show that intelligence could not possibly be pro-
grammed.  The essential conclusion of this argument is that a 
digital computer is simply a computational machine and, as 
such, it can only „interpret‟ syntax, but not semantics.  The hu-
man mind, by contrast, interprets and makes extensive use of 
semantic claims in addition to syntactic ones.  The ability to at-
tach meaning (semantics) to strings of data (syntax) is one of the 
key features of the mind.  Thus, since a digital computer does not 
have access to semantics, it cannot be a mind, regardless of the 
complexity of the program that it runs.  This, Searle claims, re-
futes the central claim of what he refers to as „strong AI‟; the 
view that an appropriate program, with the correct inputs and 
outputs, constitutes a mind, regardless of the sort of hardware on 
which it is run (e.g. whether it is a program run by a brain or a 
microprocessor). 
The Chinese room example certainly does provide addi-
tional reason to believe that the Turing test is not an adequate 
measure of machine intelligence.  As Searle‟s example shows, a 
machine (or person, in this sort of scenario) could act as if they 
understood Chinese and thus pass the Turing test when there is 
clearly no such understanding present.  But this is ultimately a 
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The Chinese Room and the Possibility of Artificial Intelligence 
 
The question that Searle really wants to answer with the 
Chinese room argument is the following:  “Is instantiating or im-
plementing the right computer program with the right inputs 
and outputs, sufficient for, or constitutive of, thinking?”2 While 
the Chinese room argument certainly shows that implementing 
the right program is not constitutive of thinking, it does not 
show that this implementation is insufficient for thinking.  
Thinking is not simply running the appropriate program but, 
running such a program creates sufficient artificial brain activity 
to give rise to thinking. 
According to Searle, all mental phenomena are caused by 
processes and states within the brain.  Searle states this more ex-
plicitly as follows:  “Mental phenomena, all mental phenomena 
whether conscious or unconscious, visual or auditory, pains, 
tickles, itches, thoughts, indeed, all of our mental life, are caused 
by processes going on in the brain.”3 For the sake of simplicity, I 
will follow Searle and abbreviate this idea with the phrase 
„brains cause minds.‟  Searle is committed to this idea because it 
helps him to offer a solution to the mind-body problem.  This 
theory has the consequence that the mind is essentially a sort of 
internal appearance of brain functions (that is, the way that we 
are aware of processes in the brain).  While we are not directly 
conscious of the workings of the brain (e.g. I am not aware of 
how a certain dendrite is acting), we are conscious of the output 
of these processes, and it is this consciousness that forms the 
mind.   However, it is very idea that also makes plausible a claim 
about the possibility of AI. 
Searle claims:  “It is essential to our conception of a digi-
tal computer that its operations can be specified purely for-
mally…”4  Further, “a typical computer „rule‟ will determine that 
when a machine is in a certain state and it has a certain symbol 
on its tape, then it will perform a certain operation…”5  That is, 
given a certain input and a certain discrete internal state, the ma-
chine will act in a certain way (that is, produce a certain output).  
But can‟t the operations of the brain be specified purely formally 
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as well?  The brain takes a certain input (say, particular sensory 
data) and, given a certain internal state, produces some output, 
which we are conscious of in the form of an appearance or 
thought.  The operation of the brain is thus strongly analogous to 
the operation of a digital computer.  But, Searle claims, “Minds 
are semantical in the sense that they have more than a formal 
structure, they have a content.”6 Thus, bearing in mind Searle‟s 
commitment to the idea that „brains cause minds,‟ it follows that 
he would have to accept one of the following claims:  “Since 
brains cause minds, and the brain has no semantic content, the 
mind can‟t have any either,” or “Since brains cause minds, and 
the brain essentially is a digital computer, an appropriately com-
plex digital computer can cause a mind as well.”  Notice that if 
the computer, coupled with its program caused a mind (as op-
posed to simply constituting one) this mind could have semantic 
content in the way that our minds do.  While the artificial brain is 
defined wholly by its syntax, the artificial mind that it causes is 
able to add meaning (or at least give this appearance of it) to this 
formal structure, just like the human mind does. 
 Consider the first two premises that Searle employs in 
deriving his overall conclusion about AI.  First, there is the claim 
that „brains cause minds.‟  Second, Searle posits as a conceptual 
truth the claim that „syntax is not sufficient for semantics.‟  Con-
sidered together, these two premises give rise to the following 
question:  what is the source of semantics?  It is relatively clear 
that the mind has access to semantics, but it is not so clear that 
the brain does.  The brain can be described as having syntax; as 
having discrete states of molecules and electrons interacting so as 
to produce a mental process.  These interactions are governed by 
formal rules (namely, the rules of biochemistry and physics).  
Thus, this syntax makes the brain a sort of formal system.  But 
could the brain, a lump of wet, grey, biological matter, actually 
have a semantics as well?  In other words, how could those dis-
crete states of molecular and electronic interaction have a mean-
ing in addition to their formal system?  If Searle‟s argument is to 
make sense, it would also have to assume that there is some sort 
of meaning lodged in the particles of brain, which seems rather 
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difficult to believe.  It seems more plausible that the brain, like 
any other organ, is simply a syntactic system.  Since, as Searle 
claims, syntax is insufficient for semantics, and the brain just is a 
syntactic system, it seems to follow that the mind could not have 
a grasp of semantics as, according to Searle, it is completely 
caused by the workings of the brain.  But the mind clearly does 
have access to semantics and meanings, so at least one of the 
premises considered here must be false. 
 I believe that the false claim is the idea that syntax is in-
sufficient for semantics.  The universe is, in a sense, a rule-based 
system governed by syntax (e.g. the laws of physics), but seman-
tics can be created within it (in the case of human minds).  In 
most cases, it is true that syntax is not sufficient for semantics, as 
one would be hard pressed to defend the claim that a stone, for 
example, can have an understanding of meaning simply because 
it is governed by syntactic rules.  However, I believe the solution 
here is that certain types of syntax, running on appropriate hard-
ware, are sufficient for semantics.  The complexity of the pro-
gram running in the brain is sufficient to produce a conscious 
mind. 
 Further, Searle‟s argument seems to hinge on the fact that 
there is only one sort of mind.  Indeed, he seems to believe that a 
human mind and a machine mind (if it were possible) would 
have to be the same sort of mind.  Searle summarizes the view 
that he criticizes, strong AI as he terms it, by stating:  “According 
to the most extreme version of this view, the brain is just a digital 
computer and the mind is just a computer program.”7 However, 
Searle claims later that proponents of strong AI believe that it‟s 
only a matter of time before technology develops artificial brains 
and minds and that “These will be artificial brains and minds 
which are in every way the equivalent of human brains and 
minds.”8 In the first case, Searle claims that strong AI holds that 
an artificial mind and a human mind would be identical, because 
they would be running the same program (albeit on different 
hardware).  However, in the second case, strong AI merely seems 
to claim that an artificial mind and a human mind would be 
equivalent (presumably in the sense that they both exhibited the 
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ability to think).  In his argument, Searle only concerns himself 
with refuting the first claim, which is a very bold claim that is not 
easily defensible.  By contrast, the second claim, that a human 
mind and an artificial mind can be equivalent, but not identical, 
is much more plausible.  However, by refuting the first claim, 
Searle also seems to believe that he has refuted the second claim 
(perhaps because he does not acknowledge a difference between 
them).  This confusion between the sorts of minds in which AI 
might be manifested helps Searle produce his misleading conclu-
sion concerning the Chinese room. 
The Chinese room argument is misleading because it asks 
us to compare the workings of an artificial brain with the work-
ings of a human mind.  The Chinese room is a completely formal, 
rule-bound system, as is the brain, whereas the workings of the 
human mind are not rule-bound.  Given this unfair comparison, 
it is clear why it is so intuitive to claim that the Chinese room is 
not an example of intelligence.  Brains, after all, are not intelli-
gent, and the Chinese room is not even sufficiently complex to be 
a functioning brain.  In short, the Chinese room does not repre-
sent a mind, which is, of course, what Searle intended to show 
with his example.  However, this does not show that a digital 
computer cannot think.  It only shows that a digital computer 
whose rules are not suitably complex to produce a mind cannot 
think. 
Thus, it is consistent to agree with parts of Searle‟s con-
clusion and still hold that AI is possible.  Searle‟s fourth conclu-
sion is especially interesting as it even hints at this possibility:  
“For any artifact that we might build which had mental states 
equivalent to human mental states, the implementation of a com-
puter program would not by itself be sufficient.  Rather, the arti-
fact would have to have powers equivalent to the powers of the 
human brain.”9 I take it that Searle means equivalent here in the 
sense that it functions to produce consciousness.  So, the artifact 
would simply have to function to produce consciousness.  The 
human brain does this, presumably, through a complex system 
of electrons and molecules interacting with one another.  The ar-
tifact would do this via a complex system of electrons interacting 
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with digital logic switches.  But this artifact could still be made 
out of anything (including „old beer cans powered by windmills,‟ 
to borrow Searle‟s derisive example).  Searle is right to say that 
the mind is not a computer program, and that a computer pro-
gram cannot be a mind.  However, this is not the real issue.  At 
the heart of the notion of AI is the idea that the mind is caused by 
a computer program, of sorts, in the brain and thus, it is clear 
that a computer program can cause a mind.  This mind would not 
have to be like the human mind necessarily (indeed, how can we 
even know that there is a single „type‟ of human mind that this 
new mind could be like?).  In short, the mind is not simply com-
plex hardware running a suitably complex program, but the 
brain is.  Thus, if all mental activity is simply the internal appear-
ance of brain activity, an artificial brain could produce a mind in 
much the same way that a real brain does.  
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